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Abstract
In an experimental framework on network formation inspired by the two-way information
flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000), we observe that many groups participating in
the experiment reach the strict Nash network resp. come very close to this network.
Compared to the results of previous network experiments this is new. Among other
things, the role of inequity aversion in explaining our experimental results is discussed.
JEL classification: C72, C78, C92
Keywords: Network formation, Nash networks, network experiment
1 Introduction
Theoretical research on networks has attracted a lot of economists during the past 10
years. The approaches by Jackson andWolinsky (1996), and by Bala and Goyal (2000) on
network formation proved to be the most influential ones. The main idea of the network
model in Bala and Goyal is similar to the model by Jackson and Wolinsky: Players obtain
payoff from being connected with other players, but have to bear connection costs if they
open links to their neighbors. Payoffs could be interpreted, for example, as generated by
valuable information flows spreading through a network. In the literature, two different
types of information flow are distinguished. In the 1-way flow model information (and
payoff) flows only to the player who opens a link. In the 2-way flow model information
(and payoff) flows both ways although only one player has to pay communication costs.
In the model by Bala and Goyal, the decisions of agents in a network to sever or open
links to other agents are strategic decisions in a non-cooperative normal form game called
network game. Nash equilibrium in the network game seems to be a weak concept since
the number of Nash equilibrium networks can become very large even in populations
of moderate size. The strict Nash concept turns out to be an important refinement.
Depending on the value of the communication costs in the 2-way flow model Bala and
Goyal show that the empty network and the so-called center sponsored star are the only
strict Nash networks which are also efficient.1
In contrast to theoretical work, until recently almost no experimental work on net-
work formation has been published. Recent economic experiments are Plott and Callan-
der (2002), Falk and Kosfeld (2003), and Deck and Johnson (2004). It was the main
purpose of their investigations to show whether subjects reach Nash equilibrium resp.
strict Nash equilibrium networks. In the 2-way information flow experiment by Falk and
Kosfeld it is one of their most important findings that in a 2-way flow network game
subjects never form strict Nash networks (within 15 rounds). Social motives like inequity
aversion are used to explain the results.
Since we want to exclude a strong influence of such social motives on network for-
mation we propose a different experimental design in which strict Nash networks evolve
significantly more often than in previous studies. In our framework, an agent does not
have access to the payoff of all agents which are only indirectly linked to him. An im-
portant consequence of this assumption is that the periphery sponsored star2 becomes a
strict Nash network (instead of a center sponsored star). Center players in a periphery
sponsored star seem to be found easier than center players in a center sponsored star.
Actually, we find that 30% of all participating groups in our experiment reach strict
Nash networks or at least remain very close to it. We do not know of any other network
experiment conducted so far in which strict Nash networks have been reached so often.
1The center sponsored star is characterized by one player (the center player) opening links to all
other players, while no other player opens a link.
2The periphery sponsored star is characterized by all players except for the center player opening
direct links to the center player while the center player himself does not open any link.
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2 The network game
The network game is characterized by the set of players I = {1, . . . , n}, the strategy
sets Gi, and payoff functions Πi(·). An individual strategy in the network game of player
i is a vector of ones and zeros gi ∈ Gi := {0, 1}n, where player i establishes a link to
player j if gij = 1, otherwise gij = 0. By convention a player cannot link with himself,
that is gii := 0 for all i. Note, that a bilateral connection between two players in our
model is supposed to be already established if at least one player wants to open it, i.e.
if gij + gji ≥ 1 holds. Each strategy configuration g = (g1, . . . , gn) generates a directed
graph denoted by Gg, where the vertices represent players and a directed edge between
i and j, i.e. gij = 1, indicates that i opens a link with j.
In our model we distinguish three types of neighbors, given a network Gg.
Actively reached neighbors are all players to whom i opens a link, that is,
Nai (gi) := {j ∈ I | gij = 1}.
Passive neighbors are all players who open a link with i, that is,
Npi (Gg) := {j ∈ I | gji = 1}.
Indirect neighbors are all actively reached or passive neighbors of all actively reached
neighbors of i, i.e.,
N indi (Gg) := {k ∈ I | ∃j 6= i 6= k : gij = 1 and max{gjk, gkj} = 1}.
Thus, the set of all neighbors of player i is given by
Ni(Gg) := Nai (gi) ∪Npi (Gg) ∪N indi (Gg).
Let ni(Gg) denote the number of elements in Ni(Gg) and nai (gi) the number of elements
in Nai (gi).
Costs for opening a link are supposed to be the same for each player and denoted by
c (> 0). The payoff player i can extract from being linked (either actively, passively or
indirectly) to player j is the same for all players and supposed to be equal to a (> 0).
Given strategy configuration g = (g1, . . . , gn), player i’s payoff is given by
Πi(g) := a ni(Gg)− c nai (gi). (1)
For network games Γ = {G1, . . . , Gn; Π1(·), . . . ,Πn(·)} a Nash network is defined to be
a vector g∗ = (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n) such that no player has an incentive neither to open nor to
sever links nor to simultaneously open and sever links generated by g∗ unilaterally.
In contrast to Bala and Goyal’s original model, we obtain different theoretical re-
sults.3 The drawings in Figure 1 illustrate the difference of a center sponsored star and
a periphery sponsored star in a population of six. No non-strict Nash network of Γ was
observed in the experiment. We will restrict ourselves to derive sufficient conditions to
characterize a strict Nash network. Graphs of all classes of Nash networks can be found
in Appendix A.
3Most important, a center sponsored star is not even a Nash network (for c < a) since any periphery
player can strictly improve his payoff by opening a link to any other player.
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Figure 1: a) center sponsored star b) periphery sponsored star
Proposition 1 If c < (n−1)a, then a periphery sponsored star is a strict Nash network.4
3 Experimental design
Our computerized experiment was performed partly in the experimental laboratory at
the University of Karlsruhe and partly at the experimental laboratory at the Sonder-
forschungsbereich 504 (University of Mannheim). Subjects were selected from a pool of
various students enrolled at different departments. Our experiment was organized in 4
sessions where 18 subjects participated in each of the sessions one and two respectively
while 12 subjects participated in each of the sessions three and four. The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree created by Urs Fischbacher
(Fischbacher, 1999).
Subjects in each session were divided into groups of 6 players who played the network
game Γ for 15 rounds.5 At the beginning of each round, each player with a mouse click
had to choose no more than 5 links to other players. Activated links of a player were
marked by red arrows in a given diagram on the screen. After each player in the group
had made his decision the resulting network was shown on the screen. In the following
round, a new drawing appeared on the screen in which each player could again activate
links. Note that a player’s links of the previous round were dropped when a new round
started. However, the graph of the previous round was additionally shown on the screen
so that players could base their decisions on a 1-round history. All groups started with
the same complete network6 (in a fictive round 0).
Payoffs per connection were set equal to 3 ECU (=experimental currency units).
Costs per link were 2 ECU. Net payoffs for each subject were accumulated over 15
rounds and payed out in cash shortly after the experiment had been finished (conversion
rate: 12 ECU = 1e). The payoff of each player before decision making started was fixed
(at 5 ECU) since all groups had to start with the same (complete) network. Although the
number of rounds for each group was fixed in advance total time spent in the laboratory
4A periphery player in a periphery sponsored star obtains net payoff equal to a(n− 1)− c which is
strictly reduced by changing links unilaterally. The center player receives net payoff equal to a(n− 1)
which is the maximal possible payoff and is strictly reduced if the center player opens a link.
5The detailed experimental instructions can be found in Appendix B.
6Where all players are directly connected with each other.
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was not fixed since the next round started only when all group members had submitted
their linking decision to the experimenter. The maximum payoff (resp. minimum) payoff
earned was equal to 16.42e (resp. 10.08e). The average payoff was 13.71e.
4 Experimental results
4.1 Describing the results
How many groups reached a strict Nash network7, that is, a periphery sponsored star
or stayed at least close to it after some rounds had elapsed?
Our definition of being close with respect to networks is based on the observation
that even in groups which did not reach a strict Nash network subjects seemed to try
to find a group member which could be designated as center player with whom they
wanted to be connected. Let us denote by Indeg(xi) the in-degree of vertex xi that
represents player i in the graph G, i.e. Indeg(xi) is equal to the number of player is
passive links. We focus on networks in which the maximum in-degree is larger than or
equal to 3, since such groups seem to be “on the way” to a periphery sponsored star. In
such networks we define our distance measure d(g) of a strategy configuration g from a
periphery sponsored star as follows. Let index i∗ be defined by Indeg(xi∗) ≥ Indeg(xj)
then we define
d(g) :=
{
5 if maxxi{Indeg(xi)} < 3
| (Indeg(xi∗)−maxxj{Indeg(xj)})− 5 | if maxxi{Indeg(xi)} ≥ 3
This distance concept compares players with maximum in-degree (=possible central
player) and second highest in-degree. If the maximum in-degree is smaller than 3 then
d(g) is equal to 5. If Indeg(xi∗) ≥ 3 and the maximum in-degree is not unique, d(g)
is equal to 5 either. Intuitively, when the difference between the maximum and the
second highest in-degree is small we are still quite distant from a periphery sponsored
star shaped network. When subtracting 5 from this difference the distance measure d(g)
is rather large. On the other hand, we have d(g) = 0 only for a periphery sponsored
star. The evolution of the distance measure for all groups over 15 rounds is shown in
Table 1. From Table 1 we conclude:
Fact 1 a) Three groups (out of ten) reached a periphery sponsored star (groups 5, 6,
10).
b) Two other groups (groups 4, 8) came very close to a periphery sponsored star.
Summarizing, about 50% of all groups reached the strict Nash network which distin-
guishes our results from those obtained by Falk and Kosfeld in the original Bala/Goyal
design where players have access to all neighbors of a neighbor who can be reached via
a path. Let us call the groups enumerated in Fact 1 “successful”. The development of
the networks of the successful groups is graphically displayed in Appendix C.
7Note that no group reached a non-strict Nash network during the course of the experiment.
4
groups
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 4 5 4 3 5 4 5 4 4 4
2 4 4 4 2 4 5 4 5 4 5
3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 2 5 5
4 5 5 4 5 2 2 5 3 3 3
5 5 3 5 5 2 1 5 4 5 3
6 4 4 3 5 2 3 4 4 5 2
7 5 4 5 4 1 1 3 2 5 1
8 4 4 4 5 1 1 5 3 3 1
9 5 5 4 5 0 0 4 2 4 1
10 4 3 4 4 0 0 5 1 4 0
11 5 3 4 4 0 0 4 1 4 0
12 3 4 4 4 0 2 5 2 5 1
13 5 3 5 3 0 1 5 1 4 0
14 4 5 5 1 0 0 5 2 3 0
15 5 3 4 1 0 0 4 1 2 0
Table 1: Evolution of distance measure d(gt) for t = 1, . . . , 15
4.2 Discussing the results
We elaborate on three aspects which may highlight the driving forces of our results. Falk
and Kosfeld (2003) argue that in their experiment subjects probably did not find the
strict Nash network (in their framework: the center sponsored star) since their design
is too complex and since inequity aversion prevents them from reaching a strict Nash
equilibrium.
α) The complexity argument: Complexity in this experiment arises from the fact that
the strict Nash network (the star) is not symmetric. In our context, one player had to
drop all links while the remaining players establish one link to him. In the Falk and
Kosfeld setting, one player has to establish links to all other players who have to be
passive (form no links).
We assume that it is easier to understand that forming links may increase payoff
when c < a than to understand that being passive might be “optimal”. In our setting,
in the strict Nash equilibrium only the center player has to understand that building no
links is optimal for him. In the Falk and Kosfeld setting, (n− 1) periphery players have
to be passive to reach the center sponsored star. Plott and Callander (2002) explain
the realization of stable networks in experiments by successful coordination of beliefs:
“... at certain critical points in network dynamics the coordination, bargaining and free
rider aspects of individual decision making become aligned and stability is achieved. At
these points it appears that all decision makers become aware of which network is best
for them, and are aware that other agents are aware of this, and so on ad infinitum.
Coordination of beliefs seems to be easier in our framework.
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β) The inequity aversion argument: Falk and Kosfeld (2003) argue that inequity aversion
may be another obstacle to subjects not reaching a center sponsored star. Concerning
their experiment, there is indeed a significant inequity of payoffs between a center player
and a periphery player which may prevent players from approaching center sponsored
stars. However, in our design the difference is not that big. A center player in a periphery
sponsored star earns 15 ECU while a periphery player earns 13 ECU. This is due to the
fact that we “cut off” paths between two players in the network that include more than
2 edges. In fact, our results support the conjecture by Falk and Kosfeld and show that
the inequity aversion hypothesis in network formation cannot be refuted.
γ) The activity argument: Our results show an additional relevant determinant of net-
work formation. Considering the behavior of subjects in the successful groups we observe
that there exist some group members who show a significantly high degree of inertia.
Most of these players, from some round on, hold only one link and do not change this
link until the end of the experiment (see Table 2). They seem to have realized that
the group would benefit most from building a periphery sponsored star (see also the
argument by Plott and Callander cited in α)).
In contrast, in most of the unsuccessful groups some of the players who build the
same links from some round on until the end build two links.
number of group
players 10 5 6 4 8 1 2 3 7 9
1 4 [1] 3 [1] 2 [1] 5 [2] 1 [1] 6 [2] 13 [2] 1 [2] 9 [2] 11 [1]
2 4 [1] 4 [1] 5 [1] 8 [1] 7 [1] 10 [1] 13 [1] 9 [2] 13 [1] 14 [1]
3 6 [1] 4 [1] 13 [1] 10 [1] 7 [1] 12 [2] – 12 [2] – 14 [1]
4 7 [1] 6 [0] 13 [1] 11 [1] 9 [1] – – 14 [2] – 14 [1]
5 10 [0] 8 [1] 14 [0] 13 [1] – – – – – –
6 13 [1] 9 [1] 14 [1] 14 [1] – – – – – –
Table 2: Number of group members with fixed links: First round of inertia (if < 15) and
number of links (in squared brackets)
Let us define the degree of inertia of a group as the average number of rounds (over
all group members) in which a group member did not change his links. In Table 3 we
arrange the groups participating in our experiment according to the degree of inertia.
Table 3 shows that the five best groups ranked according to the degree of inertia are
degree of inertia 11.50 11.33 9.67 9.33 8.50 7.00 4.33 4.17 4.00 3.17
ranked groups 10 5 6 4 8 1 2 3 7 9
Table 3: Inertia and group success
exactly the same groups which reached a periphery sponsored star resp. came close to
it.
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A Classes of Nash networks for our experimental
design
In simulations we found 3666 Nash networks, where 6 are strict Nash. After determining
the equivalence classes8 we obtained 11 classes of different size. The size gives the number
of networks in a class, for example six periphery sponsored stars, as every player can
be the center player. We present these classes of Nash networks below. Each class is
represented by a non-labeled directed graph. Class 1 consists of all strict Nash networks,
i.e., of all periphery sponsored stars. The remaining classes 2–9 are non-strict Nash
networks.
Class1(strict)
Class 1 of strict Nash equilibria (size 6)
Class 2
Class 2 of Nash equilibria (size 180)
Class 3
Class 3 of Nash equilibria (size 360)
8In graph theory the networks that belong to the same class are called isomorphic graphs.
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Class4
Class 4 of Nash equilibria (size 360)
Class 5
Class 5 of Nash equilibria (size 120)
Class 6
Class 6 of Nash equilibria (size 180)
Class 7
Class 7 of Nash equilibria (size 120)
Class 8
Class 8 of Nash equilibria (size 720)
Class 9
Class 9 of Nash equilibria (size 720)
Class 10
Class 10 of Nash equilibria (size 720)
Class 11
Class 11 of Nash equilibria (size 180)
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B Experimental instructions
Instructions
You are participating in an experiment on interactive decision making. In this exper-
iment, you can earn cash. How much you earn, depends on your own decisions and
the decisions of the other participants. In the experiment, payoffs earned are measured
in so-called currency units [CU]. The sum of currency units you earn in total will
be transformed into Euro at the end of the experiment and paid out in cash. Each
participant makes his decisions separate from the remaining participants sitting at his
computer-terminal. Communication between participants is not allowed.
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with five other par-
ticipants to form a group of six. The participants of a group are not necessarily sitting
side by side. The composition of a group persists during the course of the experiment.
There is no interaction with other groups. The six members of your group will be ran-
domly assigned the labels T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, and T6. You will find your own label
within your group on your screen at the beginning of the experiment. In the following,
the term ”participant” will be used only to denote participants of your group. Any other
participant in your group obtains exactly the same instructions as you do.
The experiment runs for 15 rounds. Each round has the same structure and consists
of two stages.
In each round’s first stage, you can open connections to the other participants of your
group. In the second stage, you will see all connections which have been built by
participants in your group, and you obtain a profit, the size of which depends on the
connections proposed by all group members.
Connections
Types of connection: There are three ways to be connected to other participants in
your group.
You can decide to open connections to other participants by yourself. These connections
will be called your active connections in this round. Your active connections will be
displayed as arrows pointing from you to other participants.
In each round, you can build active connections to as many participants as you want.
However, to each participant you can only open one active connection per round.
The participants to whom you have opened an active connection will be called your
actively reached participants. Example: In the network on page 3 in the lower left
corner of Figure 2, only T2 is actively reached by T1.
In addition to your actively reached connections, your so-called passive connections
and your indirect connections are also relevant for you. A passive connection for you
is a connection, that another participant opened to you. That is, it is a participant’s
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active connection to you. Example: In Figure 2 (lower left edge) T1 has a passive
connection with T6.
The passive and active connections of your actively reached participants are
called your indirect connections. In other words, these are the passive and active
connections of those participants, to whom you have an active connection. Through
your passive connections you do not have access to indirect connections.
A participant cannot open connections with himself.
Type of connection Meaning
1. active Your connection to another participant.
Graphical illustration:
2. passive Other participant’s connection to you.
Graphical illustration:
3. indirect Active and passive connections of a participant,
who is actively reached by you.
Graphical illustration (two possibilities of indirect
connection):
Table 1: Types of connection
If you have an active and a passive connection to a participant at the same time, it will
be displayed as a double arrow.
The following Figure 1 illustrates the meaning of the denotations ”active,” ”passive” and
”indirect” connection from T1’s point of view. This figure only helps the illustration.
In the experiment, the arrows will neither be labeled nor broken (in Figure 2 in the lower
left corner you can see, what the network of Figure 1 will look like in the experiment ).
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Figure 1: Types of connection from T1’s point of view
The arrowheads in Figure 1 point away from the participant, who has opened the con-
nection. The dashed arrows have no consequences for T1’s profit. T1 is connected with
the participants T2, T3, T4 and T6 marked in grey (in the experiment: black mark-
ing, see lower left corner of Figure 2). T2 is actively reached by T1, since T1 has an
active connection to T2. T1 is indirectly connected to T3 and T4, because T2, who is
actively reached by him, is passively resp. actively connected with them. T1 is passively
connected to T6. T1 is not connected with T5.
Establishing connections: In the first stage of a round a so-called line network (Figure
2, upper part) is shown to you. Its edges indicate all possible connections between the
members of the group.
You can mark active connections to other participants by clicking on one ore more lines,
heading from you (box marked in red) to another participant. You can only choose
some of the five edges pointing away from you. If you click on one of these edges, it
will become bold and will be marked in red color. It will point to the participant you
selected. In the example in Figure 2 (upper part) T1 marked two connections to T3 and
T5 respectively. In the lower right corner of the screen, the display of the associated
active connection switches from ”no” to ”yes” when marking a line. You can make your
marks disappear by clicking on the line a second time (the red arrow switches back to a
black line and the display in the lower right corner switches back to ”no”). If you click
on the same line again it will again be marked red and so on. You can submit your final
decision by clicking on the OK-button.
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Figure 2: Screen plot of T1 - first stage: Choice of active connections and display of
the last round’s network
When a new round starts, the line network in Figure 2 (upper part) only contains all
possible links from a player to the remaining group members. None of the links is
displayed as a red arrow yet. Your active connections of the previous round will not be
carried over. In each round, you can open zero to five links to arbitrary participants
in your group.
In the second stage of each round, the network built in the first stage of the round will be
shown to you. You see all connections, that you and the other participants have chosen
in the first stage of the round, displayed as arrows. All participants to whom you have
an active, passive or indirect connection, following the rules given above, are marked
in black (similar to the network in the lower left corner of Figure 2).
Network of the previous round: In the lower left corner of Figure 2, you see the
network of the previous round. It is exactly the network, that has been shown to you in
the second stage of the previous round.
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Costs and earnings
Now you are informed about all three types of connection. In this section, we explain,
how your earnings are determined.
Costs: Each active connection that you have chosen in the first stage of a round
generates costs equal to 2 CU. Your passive and indirect connections do not incur
connection costs. That is, each connection is paid by the player who opened it. In the
case of double arrows (←→), this means that both players have to pay for the connections
they opened.
Earnings: Your earnings are determined by the number of participants you are con-
nected with.
For each participant you are connected with (either actively, or passively, or indirectly),
you obtain an amount of 3 CU. The participants you are connected with (either ac-
tively, or passively, or indirectly) in the second stage of a round as well as in the display
of the network of the previous round are marked in black (as mentioned before).
Multiple connections with a participant (e.g. simultaneously active and passive connec-
tions to the same participant) do not generate multiple earnings. Example: T5 in Figure
1 earns only 3 CU through his connection with T3, although he has an active, a passive,
and an indirect connection with T3.
Your earnings of one round are calculated as follows: Count the number of partici-
pants you are connected with (maximum 5) and multiply it by 3 CU. Your earnings are
then between 0 CU and 5 · 3 = 15 CU.
Profit: Your profit is the sum of your earnings in a round minus your costs from active
connections in this round.
Profit = (Sum of earnings) - (Costs from active connections)
Your accumulated profits in a round equal the sum of all your profits up to the current
round.
First Round
Other than in the remaining rounds, the first round starts by displaying a given com-
plete network (of the fictive round 0) where each participant is actively connected with
all other participants. For each of your active connections you pay the costs of 2 CU
and you receive the earnings for the connections. All participants obtain the same net
profit which is equal to 15 − 10 = 5 CU. This will be credited to your account in the
first round.
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Payment
After the end of the 15 rounds, your accumulated profits will be calculated in Euro. The
conversion rate is 12 CU to one Euro.
When the experiment is finished, the amount of Euro you have earned will be paid out
in cash. The payment will be made individually and anonymous.
Hint: When choosing your active connections there is a little time delay until the arrow
appears marked by bold red colour. Clicking one time is sufficient, a double-click is not
necessary. Do not click again on the line too fast, otherwise, the arrow might disappear
again. Please, wait before you click on the “OK-button”, to guarantee that all planned
active connections are transmitted. Check if all chosen active connections in the display
at the bottom right have switched from “no” to “yes”.
Before the experiment starts, you will be asked some questions about the rules of this
game. If there is anything you do not understand, let us know. Your questions will be
answered directly at your seat.
15
C Development of the networks of successful groups
Round0
T1 T4
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T2 T3
Round 1
T1 T4
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Round 3
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